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AN ENVELOPE OF SATURN V FlALFUNCT?ON 
TRAJECTORIES WHICH Ckh' 9CHIEVE ORBIT 
By H. G. Schaeffer, V. A .  Dulock, and J. J. White 
I ,  SUMMARY 
1 
Abort envelope a on the Flight Dynamic s 0fficer8e plotboards which 
provide an early warning of an impending abort situation are  presented 
for  the AS- 503 /CSM- 103 launch trajectory. These abort envelopes repre- 
sent the limit of the capability of a malfunctioning vehicle to attain a 
contingency orbit. The envelopes have been constructed as that there i e  
negligible probability of the trajectory penetrating the envelope and then 
reaching a costingency orbit. 
The specific malfunctions which were considered in defining the 
abort envelope are  loss of inertial attitude referecce, platform gyro drift, 
f i rs t  and second stage engine actuator hardover, loss of X-axis acceier- 
ometer, failure of second stage engine to ignite, and premature shutdown 
of f irst  stage engine. Abort limit lines, which represent the combined 
effects of these failures, a re  preeented for the inertial flight-path angle 
ver sue inertial velocity (V- y) and altitude versus range plotboarda. 
The baseline trajectory used in the production of this docwnent Was 
the June Mission D ogerational trajectory. Since there are oniy minor 
differences in the ApolLo 8 ( A S - ~ O ~ / C S M - ~ O ~ )  launch trajectory, 
presented herein is intended for use durinq the iLpollo 8 launch. 
the information I 
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2. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this investigation i s  to determine limit lines on the 
V-y and altitude-range plots which provide the Flight Dynamics Officer s. 
with an early indication of an impending abort situation. These limit lines * 
a r e  derived by considering vehicle malfunctions which cause the trajectory 
! to slowly diverge from nominal. Malfunctions which a r e  directijr moni - .* 
'. '., 
tored by the Emergency Detection System (EDS) and which cause an imme- .e .-?. 
diate abort eituation a r e  not considered here. 4 
- .,#
Vehicle malfunctions may be catagoribed a s  follows: 
a. Those which are monitored by the EDS and which lead to an 
immediate abort situation 
b. Those which a r e  monitored by EDS hut which cause the booster 3 :.- .$ 
to deviate slowly from the nominal trajectory 4 
$Zj 
c. Thoee which a re  not monitored by the EDS < G 6 
:?" Since the present investigation i s  concerned with malfunctions which cause 3 
slow divergence from the nominal. trajectory only the last two catagoriea 
- f 
a r e  appropriate. --" 
-* 
. . 
.p 
t A previous investigation was made to determine the most crit ical 
Saturn V ma1funct;ons which were not monitored by the EDS (Reference I ) .  8 
The data source for the study was Reference 2. Pi - I %  
-* 3 
The feasibility of simulating the malfunctions in  order to obtain 
meaningful abort limit lines was studied by using the TRW Saturn Launch 
Vehicle . S i m ~ a t _ 2 ~ ~ ) B m m a n a  ( R e f e s d b  The results nf the -. . 
. . * - --. . 
feasibility study (~e f e r en>e  4) indicated that malfunctions which lead to 
slowly divergent trajectories could be identified, and the resulting limit 
lines would provide the Flight Dynamic8 Officer wirh an early indication 
of an impending abort situation. 
- .-- 
In defining the abort limit lines, i t  i s  assumed for the purpose of 
this investigation, that a successful contingency orbit i s  attained provided 
the following criteria a r e  met. 
a. The preeent abort limits on structural breakup, time of free-  
fall and  ini it g-loads must not be violated. 
b. The actual orbital insertion altitude must be within 10 nautical 
miles of that specified by the operational trajectory (orr). . 
c. The i r -e~~t ia l  flight-path angle at orbital insertion must be within 
. . .- 
two degree6 of that specified by the OT. 
Since t h e r e  a r e  only minor d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  t h e  Apollo 8 ( A S - ~ O ? / C Z M - ~ O ~ )  
h u n c h  trn.. j  ectory, t h e  informst ion p r e s e ~ t e d  h e r e  i n  i n I nt.cndr*d Car n : : ~  I I I A I -  i l l c r  
the Apol l n  f l  launch.  
-i' 
Y 
. C r i t i c a l  and c r i t i c a l i t y  i n  t h i s  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  are def ined  as ( 1 - ~ e l i a b i l  i ; 1 : 
x l o 6  i n  keeping wi th  Reference 2. 
3. MALFUNCTION SIMULATION RESULTS 7 
Rather than consider only non-EDS malfunctions, the scope of the 
malfunctions to be considered in defining the abort limit lines has been 
enlarged in the present investigation to include all malfunctions which may 
lead to  a slowly divergent trajectory. The booster malfunctions which a r e  
considered a r e  presented in Table 1, together with the effect and criticality 
numbers associated with each failure. This malfunclion information 
includes only those failures which a r e  the top 10 single point failures per  
stage (Reference 2). The total flight criticality of the SA-502 booster 
(assumed to be the same for  the SA-503) is  75,483 (Reference 2). The 
total criticality of the. malfunctions presented in Table 1 i s  19, 11 1, o r  
25.6 per  cent of the total criticality. The remaining 74.4 percent of the 
criticality ie associated with malfunctions which a r e  monitored by Eljd 
and which result  in sudden failure of the booster. The SLVS Drogram can 
realistically simulate malfunctions indicated by an as te r i sk  in  Table 1 
which have a criticality of 16,852 o r  22. 6 percent of the total flight 
criticality. The other malfunctions presented in Table 1 cannot be sim- 
ulated directly; however, the effect of a battery failure, for  instance, will 
resul t  in loss  of guidance which can be simulated. Most of the malfunc- 
tions which may lead to slowly divergent t ra jectory can be simulated, so 
they a r c  considerad in defining the abort  l imits  lines. 
A previous study for the S-IB configuration (Reference 5) indicated 
that not all the malfunctions in Table 1, which could be simulated, a r e  
active in deficing the abort  l imit  lines. Several  of the malfunctions resul t  
in either rapid loss  of control o r  a trajectory which is so  close to  
nominal that i t  i s  not active in  defining the abort  l imit  lines. On the basis  
of Reference 3, the following malfunctions a r e  considered in the present 
atudy: 
a. Lose of inert ial  attitude reference 
b. Inertial platform gyro drift 
c.  F i r s t  stage actuator hardover 
d. X-axis platform accelerometer failure 
In addition, the following malfunctions, which a r e  applicable to  
Saturn V launches, a r e  considered: 
e. Second etage actuator hardover 
f. S-II engine out 
g. S-IC engine out 
Thc malfunction simulations were performed by using thc TRW 
Saturn Launch Vehicle Simulation (SLVS) Progrzm (Reference 3). Thc 
nominal trajectory a s  determined f rom SLVS ie compared to  the opera- 
tiona: t ra jectory f o r  AS-503 (Reference 6)' It i e  concluded that the SLVS 
p r o g r a m  h a s  adeqcately simulated the AS-503 vehi ~ l e  control  dynamics 
and guidan.:e during the l a ~ , ~ c h  p ase f r o m  l if t -off  t o  e a r t h  orbi t  insert ion 
(Kcfe rence  6). The t r a j ec to ry  simulat ion includes the wind-biased 
t r a j e c t o r y  together  with the mean December  - to-March launch winds. 
T r a j e c t o r y  d i spe r s ions  due t o  wind have not beer, cons idered  in th is  study. 
A discuss ion of the  individual malfunction simulat ion resu l t s  i s  ;. 'e- 
sented in Sections 3. l  through 3 .7 .  The composi te  abor t  l imi t  l ines  arc 
presented in Section 4. 
3 .1  X-Axis P l a t f o r m  A c c e l e r o m e t e r  F a i l u r e  
This  malfunction r e ~ u l t s  f r o m  fa i lu re  of the  S T  - I U - M Z  ine r t i a l  
p la t form a c c e l e r o m e t e r s  which a r e  in tegra ted  t o  de te rmine  the vehicle 
velocity. If the velocity word f a i l s  t o  sa t i s fy  a p r e s e t  r easonab leness  tes t ,  
the guidance s y s t e m  swi tches  t o  a backup mode f o r  calculat ing velclcity 
using tabulated values of vehicle t h r u s t  and m a s s  v e r s u s  t ime .  
The fa i lu re  s imulat ion u s k g  tabulated t h r u s t  and m a s s  f r o m  the  
OT r e s u l t s  in an  a l m o s t  nominal  t ~ a j e c t o r y ;  thus,  th i s  f a i lu re  i s  not 
act ive in defining the abor t  l imi t  l ine.  
3 . 2  P l a t f o r m  Gyro  Dr i f t  
This  malfunction r e s u l t s  f r o m  fa i lu re  of the  p r e s s u r e  r egu la to r  
which supplies  gaseous  n i t rogen t o  the bea r ings  of the ine r t i a l  p l a t fo rm.  
The off-nominal  p r e s s u r e  induces bear ing  f r ic t ion  wnich l eads  to  g y r o  
dr i f t .  
I t  was foun_d tha t -+  7 d e g r e e  p e r  hour  pi tch d r i f t  i s  the max imum 
which r e s u l t s  in  a n  off-nominal t r a j e c t o r y  which sa t i s f i e s  the  a l t i tude  
cr i te r ion .  Th i s  malfunction is ac t ive  in  defining the  a b o r t  l i m i t  l ines  on 
both the  V- y and alt;.tude- range  plots.  
3.3 L o s s  of Ine r t i a l  Attitude Reference  
This  malfunction r e s u l t s  f r o m  fa i lu re  of the  ST-124-M2 ine r t i a l  
p la t form.  The guidance s y s t e m  continues to  corrpute guidance commands  
based on the l a s t  va lues  of m e a s u r e d  at t i tude e rmr  which sa t i s fy  a p r e s e t  
reasonableness  t e s t .  Since guidance continues t o  compute, a contingency 
o rb i t  cannot: be achieved unless  e i t h e r  the f a i lu re  o c c u r s  l a t e  in the  flight 
o r  the e r r o r s  which a r  f rozen  a r e  such  tha t ,  by chance,  o rb i t a l  i n s e r -  
tion i s  at tained.  
In the p resen t  study, this  malfunction i s  ac t ive  in defining the  ahor t  
l imi t  l ines  f o r  t i m e s  late. in t h e  flight. 
3 .4  F i r s t  Stage Pitch Actuator Hardove r 
This malfunction results f rom the failure of a thrust vector control 
subsystem servo actllator in the fully extended o r  fully retracted position 
which causes the engine to go to its fully deflected positicn of 5. 15 degrees. 
The vehicle will pitch-up for pitch actuators fully extended on engines 1 
and 4 and fully retracted actuators on engines 2 and 3. 
The failure was ~ imula ted  on engine 1 a t  lift-off and the resulting 
trajectory is -active in defining the abort limit line. 
3 . 5  Second Stage Pitch Actuator Hardover 
This failure is  not presented a s  one of the top 10 criticality items 
per stage in Reference 2; however, because of the intpolrlance of i i r s t  
stage actuator hardover in defining the abort limit lines, failure of the 
second stage actuator was considered. The results of Che simulation 
stlidy indicate that this failure does not contribute to the abort envelope. 
3 .6  S-I1 Engine Out at Ignition 
This failure may be due to one of the following malf;.nctions: 
I I a. Static-ixverter in no output, distorted o u t p ~ t ,  and low output" 
mode 
I I b. Ga.3 generator cornbuster assembly in the chsck valve fails 
to open" mode 
c. "Turbopump assembly in faiks to start1 '  mode 
d. "Gas ger~erator control valve aee ernbly in fails to open on demand" 
mode 
e. "Ignition phaee solenoid operated control valve in fails to  actuate1I 
mode 
f. I '  Main oxidizer valve assembly in a l l  failure" modes 
I I 
g. Mainstage solenoid operated control value in fails to actuate 
when energized" o r  "Cloeee during engine operation prior t > engine start" 
mode e 
Thie malfunction ie  eirrulated at t ime of eecond atage ignition, and ie  
found to be active in defining the abort limit liner. 
3.7 S -1C Engine Out 
This failure would result from a premature closure of the gas gen- 
e ra tor  control valve. The malfunction was eirnulated by hut t ing  engine i 
down a t  3, 11, 60, and '74 seconds and engine 2 a t  60 seconds af ter  engi.,e 
ignition. The simulation accounted for  the chi-freeze initiation t imes  and 
durations a s  presented in the OT. The '7-y and altitude-range plcts 
comparing simulation resul ts  f rom the SLVS program with resul ts  obtained 
i r o m  Marshall Spaceflight Center (MSFC) for  malfunctions a t  3 and 
60 seconds a r e  shown in Figures  1 and 2, respectively. Thc SLVS and 
MSFN data a r e  in  qualitative agreement. The difference is attributed, a t  
least  in  part,  to  the f-tct that the MSFC simulation is fo r  the Crn!l~ i; 
booster while the simulation in  the present investigation is for  the 
D mission. The malfunction causes  a large excursion f ro& nominal on the 
V - v  and altitude-range plots and is active in defining the abort limit lines. 
The V - y  and altitude-range plots for engine i out a t  11 and 74 seconds and 
engine 2 out  at  60 seconds a r e  not presented since these malfunctions a r e  
not active in defining the aboct limit lines. 
4. CONTINGENCY ORSIT' ABORT ENVELOPES 
The contingency orbit abort envelope for  Satllrn \' launches has been 
determined by simulating the trajectory of a malfunctioning vehicle with 
the 'I'RW Satwn Launch Vehicle Simulation Program. In this study, 
nominal vehicle properties such a s  mass, thrust, center-of-gravity 
location, control system constants, etc. , .have been used. The control 
system i s  biased for a mean December-to-March wind, and the mean wind 
i s  included. 
- > 
- .. 
The V- y and altitude- range plots a re  shown in Figures 3 and 4, 
respectively with the malfunctions which are  active in defining the abort 
limit line s . 
~ - 
a. S-IC, pitch actuator pitch-ap and pitch-down 
5. S-IC engine out at  60 seconds (composite of MSFC and TRW 
simulations) 
d. Loss or' inertia? attitude reference 
- .- 
The m=lk.kiona which a re  active in defining the ahort : h i t  lines 
on the altitude- range plot are: 
- - 
- 
a. S-IC pitch actuator pitch-up 
b. S-PC en gin^ out a t  60 secsnds { W F C  simdatim) 
c. S-II engine out at  S-I1 ignition 
d. Platform gyro drift 
- . 
The csmpoaite abort limit lines on the V-y and altitude-range plots 
are  presented in Figures 5 and 6, respectively. The currezt abcrt k n i t s  
(Reference 7) a re  shown in Figure 5 for purpose of coinparison. It can be 
. 
seen that the abort limit based on capabiity of a malfunctioning 
booster to reach a contingency arbit provide the Flight Dyaamics  Officer 
with much earlier abort cue tha,, the c ~ r r e n t  limit lines. 
Tte abort limit lines preaa.nted i n  the previoua fignrce arc* ha~c t l  on 
nomind Sooet vehicle and environmental properties. It is c- l w i c > r i i i  that 
the trajectory envelope formed by tale abort limit lines would bc witictr i f  
the statistical variation of vehicle and environmental properties waa 
considered. 
The statistical variations a r e  accounted for i n  the prcecnt invosti- 
gation by aigebraica:ly addz.ng the nominal diapereion in thc flight 
parametere to the abort lirmf l i ~ e s  preeentcd in Figitrcn 5 and 0. Thin 
modification of the abort limit linee is ehown in F i ~ u r c n  7 awl  H f or  I l ~ c .  
V- y arid altitude- range plote, rcs.;2c.c4 ivrly.  
5. CONCLVSLONS AND P.ECOMMEND.ATIONS 
Abort lirrlit -lines have been determined on the Flight Dynamics 
Officer's V- y and altitude-range plot boards. These limit lines represent 
the limit of the capability of a malfunctioning boost vehicle to achieve a 
contingeacy orbit. The purpose of the abort limit lines is to provide the 
Flight Dynamics Officer with an early indication tha; a vehicle which is 
slowly diverging from a nominal trajectory will not teach a contingency 
orbit. 
The curves presented in Figures 7 and 8 include the effect of vehicle 
malfunctions and dispersions. It i s  recommended that consideration be 
given to incorporatkq these curves on the Flight Dynamics Officer's V-y 
and altitude range plotboards for use as an early abort cue. 
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